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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
EXCLUSION OF INMATES FROM SERVICES IN PRISONS:
A PROPOSED ANALYTICAL APPROACH REGARDING
THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
OF A PRISONER'S ADA CLAIM
BRIAN LESTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v.
Yeskey' resolved a division among the circuits regarding the applicability of
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)2 to state prisons.3 In Yeskey,
the Supreme Court held that the ADA applies to state prisons,4 yet the
Court left some important issues unresolved, including the appropriate level
of scrutiny a court should apply in deciding whether a disabled inmate has
been excluded from a prison's services, programs, or activities 5 in violation
of the ADA.6 The ADA's application to prisons can fall into three general
categories: (1) the prison's policies and procedures, (2) architectural
barriers inmates confront, and (3) an inmate's ability to communicate.7
When a court analyzes an inmate's claim under any of these categories,
ample room for disagreement regarding the appropriate level of review
. Judicial Law Clerk, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2002,
Summa Cum Laude; B.A., University of Washington, 1998, Political Science, Cum Laude; Busi-
ness Administration, Magna Cum Laude. I wish to dedicate this article to my late grandparents.
1. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
2. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 331 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
3. Christopher J. Burke, Note, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Judicial Scrutiny of
Prisoners' Statutory Claims Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 98 MICH. L. REV. 482,
483 (1999). For a copy of the amici brief filed on behalf of Yeskey, the respondent, see generally
Brief of Amici Curiae ADAPT, Pennsylvania Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities et al., Pa.
Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (No. 97-634).
4. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 213.
5. I regularly refer to "services," however one could substitute the word "programs" or
"activities" for purposes of this article.
6. Susan B. Hoppe, Broad Statutory Language is Not Ambiguous: The Americans With
Disabilities Act Applies in State Prisons, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 275, 282 (1998).
Although prisoners may allege violations under any title of the ADA, most litigation, not
surprisingly, is brought under Title II, which applies to discrimination in services, programs, or
activities by state and local entities. Id.
7. Paula N. Rubin & Susan W. McCampbell, The Americans With Disabilities Act and
Criminal Justice: Mental Disabilities and Corrections, NIJ RESEARCH IN ACTION, July 1995,
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/amdisact.txt.
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arises from the deference courts have traditionally afforded to prison regu-
lations and policies. 8
Yeskey, and the controversy it has generated over the ADA's
application to state prisons, seemed in many ways destined to collide with
an earlier Supreme Court decision, Turner v. Safley.9 In Turner, the Court
applied a deferential standard of review to a prison policy that an inmate
alleged infringed on his right to free speech under the First Amendment.1o
The Turner doctrine, under which a prison regulation challenged on the
grounds of a constitutional right violation will be upheld so long as it is
reasonably related to a legitimate penalogical interest, emerged from this
decision.It How the Turner doctrine applies to prisoners' statutory rights
has not been clear. Nevertheless, the Yeskey and Turner issues have
converged. While some incorporation of the Turner doctrine into the ADA
appears inevitable, its precise form and the weight assigned to prison
policies are far from certain. Subsequent courts have either fully adopted
the rationally related to legitimate penalogical interests approach or have
adopted it in a modified form, generally by rejecting full incorporation of
Turner or including the Turner principles within some part of the ADA
analysis. 12
Resolution of this issue will have far reaching consequences, and
courts should avoid approaches that favor either extreme. The ease with
which a prison can justify its regulation under the Turner doctrine threatens
to eviscerate the applicability of the ADA from prisons altogether,
manifesting a complete departure from the Supreme Court's decision in
Yeskey.13 On the other hand, incorporating the Turner principles within the
8. See infra Part III.
9. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). A majority of courts disallow an action under Title II of the ADA
brought against an individual. Berthelot v. Stadler, No. 99-2009, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15615,
at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 20, 2000).
10. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
11. Id. A common example of a penalogical interest is prison security. Burke, supra note 3,
at 485 n.21.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 607 (4th Cir. 1997),
vacated, 524 U.S. 935 (1998). The Fourth Circuit, in fact, cited and discussed Gates v. Rowland,
39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), as one reason why Congress had not intended to apply the ADA to
state prisons. Id. This was contrary to the requirements of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines with
which the ADA mandates compliance. Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America Meets Dante's
Inferno: The Americans With Disabilities Act in Prison, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 49, 82, 85
(1996). Also working against this proposal is the fact that courts, prior to the ADA, interpreted
the Rehabilitation Act to apply to prisons and prisoners. Jennifer L. Lange, Note, Biting the Hand
That Feeds Them-State Prisons and the ADA: Responding to Amos v. Maryland Department of
Public Safety & Correctional Services, 1998 BYU L. REv. 875, 889 (1998). Following enactment
of the ADA, extensive hearings were conducted on its impact on prisons, which was among the
topics discussed and later codified into the interim rule. Robbins, supra, at 82.
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existing ADA analytical framework without some methodological process
to account for the security concerns of prisons could create outcomes that
unduly interfere with prison policies.14
Unfortunately, courts have done just what should have been avoided.
The underlying principles that drive the traditional deference to prisons'
security concerns ought to be integrated into the meaning of the terms
"reasonable accommodation"' 5 and "fundamentally alter," 16 with reliance
on several factors to guide courts. Because considerable uncertainty
remains with respect to the precise role of the Turner doctrine in the context
of the ADA, courts can provide interested parties with better notice of a
suit's likely outcome through announcing and applying common factors.
Having at least settled part of the issue in Yeskey,17 the Supreme Court
should now provide guidance to lower courts regarding inquiries into the
reasonableness of a prison's exclusionary policies or rules. In doing so, it
would overrule those courts that have inappropriately placed the burden on
plaintiffs to overcome the presumption that prison policies are reasonable. ' 8
This article is designed to provide an analytical approach for courts to
apply when analyzing ADA claims brought against prisons that will
properly balance the needs of those inmates living with disabilities with the
need for effective prison policies. With this goal in mind, Part II begins by
describing the background and purpose of the ADA and the background of
Turner. Part III discusses the range of approaches courts have adopted to
decide the merits of ADA claims brought by inmates against prisons or
other correctional facilities. Finally, Part IV explains that these approaches
fall short of providing, on a consistent basis, satisfactory results for both
sides, and that in light of the importance of both the ADA and effective
prison policies, courts ought to adopt an approach that better balances these
often-competing interests. In applying the ADA to prisons, courts can more
successfully effectuate Congress's intent by applying a level of scrutiny that
will result in meaningful enforcement against discrimination in the services
provided to inmates with disabilities, without treading unnecessarily on the
appropriate discretion of prison officials.
14. See generally Turner, 482 U.S. 78.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(A) & (B) (2000).
16. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
17. See Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (determining that the ADA
applies to state prisons).
18. See infra Part III.
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II. THE BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE ADA AND ITS
APPLICATION TO STATE PRISONS
After nearly twenty years of hearings, investigations, and public de-
bate, Congress enacted the ADA in recognition of the overwhelming public
consensus that further structural and institutional changes were necessary in
order to eliminate the barriers persons with disabilities encounter
everyday. 19 The ADA recognized the harm of discrimination and that
society had created insurmountable obstacles on those with disabilities.
Justin Dart, whose views many in Congress found influential just prior to
passing the ADA, described society's general attitude that persons with
disabilities were less than whole as the most significant obstacle
encountered by persons with disabilities.20 Common experience suggests
that being negatively stereotyped and stigmatized are likely among the most
significant attitudinal barriers persons with disabilities face. After
generations of ignoring and marginalizing people with disabilities, the ADA
represented the emergence of a paradigm shift in which what has been
coined an "integrative view" replaced the traditional segregationalist and
sheltered focused view.21 Rather than emphasizing physical and mental
differences, the integrative approach seeks to achieve equality through
emphasizing and harmonizing our similarities. 22
A. BACKGROUND OF THE ADA
In 1990, Congress passed the ADA to expand the scope of protections
afforded to persons with disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.23
Years earlier, Congress had tried to remedy discrimination against persons
with disabilities by enacting laws targeting specific areas of public life,
such as architectural barriers to education, transportation, and housing.24
Much of what drove Congress to enact the ADA was Congress's perceived
inadequacy of both state and federal legislation, particularly the
19. See James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against
State Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41
ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 691 (1999).
20. See Robert L. Mullen, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Introduction for
Lawyers and Judges, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 175, 177 (1994).
21. Id. at 178.
22. See id.
23. Lange, supra note 13, at 877; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat.
355 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000)). The Rehabilitation Act's reach had
been limited to prohibiting discrimination by entities receiving federal assistance. Lange, supra
note 13, at 877.
24. Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mistique, Morrison, and the
Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 162-63 (2000).
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Rehabilitation Act, which covered neither the private sector 25 nor those in
the public sector that did not receive federal funding. 26 What some
proclaimed to be the "Emancipation Proclamation" for persons with
disabilities, the ADA forever changed the legal landscape for persons with
disabilities by covering a multitude of services and programs in both the
public and private sphere, and by affording each individual an
individualized remedy.27
As part of its broad reach, Congress divided the ADA into separate
Titles, which collectively cover most areas of public life. 28 Included in
these are employment (Title I),29 public services (Title II),30 and public
accommodations (Title III).31 The overwhelming majority of ADA claims
brought against prisons involve actions under Title 11.32 Title II is distinct
from the others insofar as Congress refrained from providing much of its
substantive content, opting instead to leave the task to the Attorney
General. 33 Much of the generality surrounding the scope of Title II arises
from the fact that unlike Titles I and III, Title II contains only a general
prohibitory clause against discrimination in the areas of services, programs,
and activities 34 and applies only to state and local governments. 35 As an
interpretative matter, Congress modeled Title II after § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act so pre-ADA regulations and case law apply with equal
force today. 36
25. See Hoppe, supra note 6, at 279.
26. See id. at 282-83.
27. Emily Alexander, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act and State Prisons: A
Question of Statutory Interpretation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2233, 2237 (1998).
28. See generally Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
331 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
29. 42U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
30. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
31. Id. §§ 12181-12189; PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).
32. See, e.g., Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 207 (1998). Title II provides,
"Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a); Michael H. Gottesman, Symposium, Disability, Federalism, and a
Court with an Eccentric Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 33 (2001).
34. Leonard, supra note 19, at 694-95, 739.
35. Mullen, supra note 20, at 196. Because Title II applies only to "public entities,"
individuals may not be sued in their individual capacities. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184
F.3d 999, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1999).
36. See Armstrong v. Davis, No. 99-15152, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6821, at *5 n.3 (9th Cir.
Apr. 11, 2000); see also Cary LaCheen, Using Title I1 of the Americans With Disabilities Act on
Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 38 (2001).
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To prevail in an ADA claim under Title II, plaintiffs bear the initial
burden of showing that they are qualified individuals with disabilities who
have been excluded from either a service, program, or activity based on the
their respective disabilities. 37 As a general matter, to show that a plaintiff is
otherwise qualified, that plaintiff must either "show[] that he or she is
capable of participation in a program, either with or without [reasonable]
accommodation." 38 The plaintiff must also show that denial of meaningful
access was the result of one's disability or perceived disability. 39 Plaintiffs
able to demonstrate that they are qualified individuals must then show they
were excluded from participation, denied benefits, or subjected to
discrimination by the public entity.40
Once an individual is able to satisfy these requirements, that individual
becomes entitled to reasonable accommodation, 4' which can be found in the
ADA's implementing regulations, 4 2 and operationally speaking, the burden
shifts to the defendant.43 Where a prison fails to make reasonable
accommodations, it may argue as an affirmative defense that the requested
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the prison or impose
an undue burden.4 In other words, where the availability of reasonable
accommodations are shown, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion to
show that such "an accommodation would impose an undue hardship." 45
37. See Richard E. Kaye, What Constitutes Reasonable Accommodation Under Federal
Statutes Protecting Rights of Disabled Individual, as Regards Educational Program or School
Rules as Applied To Learning Disabled Student, 166 A.L.R. FED. 503, 514-16 (2000). To state a
claim under this Title, the plaintiff must allege the following four elements:
(1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified
to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or
activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits-of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits,
or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability.
Thompson v. Davis, 282 F.3d 780, 783-84 (9th Cir. 2002).
38. Onishea v. Hopper (Onishea I), 126 F.3d 1323, 1330 (1 1th Cir. 1997), vacated by
Onishea v. Hopper (Onishea II), 133 F.3d 1377 (11 th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
39. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001); Resel v. Fox, No. 01-
1599, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27045, at *11 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
41. Scott v. Kelly, 107 F. Supp. 2d 706, 711 n.12 (E.D. Va. 2000).
42. Kaye, supra note 37, at 514-16 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2002)).
43. See id. at 515.
44. Mullen, supra note 20, at 198; Ann K. Wooster, When Does a Public Entity Discriminate
Against Disabled Individuals in its Provision of Services, Programs, or Activities Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132, 163 A.L.R. FED. 339, 359-63 (2000). The
regulations define undue burden as a "fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program,
or activity or in undue financial or administrative burdens." 28 C.F.R. 35.150(a)(3).
45. Onishea I, 126 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated, 133 F.3d 1377 (11th Cir.
1998) (quoting Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
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The public entity's decision to take this exemption must have been made by
the person in charge of the entity. 46 Moreover, parties seeking this
exemption generally find it difficult to convince a court because a court
bases its decision to grant an exemption on all of the entity's available
resources. 47 In cases where the accommodation is necessary, the plaintiff
retains the burden of proving that reasonable accommodations were
available throughout the litigation.48
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ADA AS APPLIED TO STATE
PRISONS
As state prisoners' claims began to appear, circuit courts, based pri-
marily on federalism principles, 49 were divided on the issue of whether the
ADA applied to state correctional facilities. 50 The circuit split arose despite
Congress's intent to delegate implementation of each title to the agencies
responsible for issuing regulations51 and subsequent ADA-based regulations
promulgated by the Department of Justice specifically referring to state
prisons.52 Courts, nevertheless, were divided on the issue of whether
Congress manifested a clear intent to abrogate state-managed prison facili-
ties when it enacted the ADA in accordance with the principles of federal-
ism.5 3 For example, the Fourth Circuit in Torcasio v. MurrayS4 held that
state prisons, due to federalism principles, did not fall under the term
"public entity" in the ADA.55 The court found that Congress, when it
enacted the ADA, did not speak with the unmistakable clarity required to
abrogate state sovereignty in an area traditionally managed by the states.56
As alluded to above, the Supreme Court finally resolved the issue on
the applicability of the ADA to state correctional facilities when it decided
Yeskey. 57 The respondent, Yeskey, who was denied placement in the state's
46. Mullen, supra note 20, at 198.
47. Id.
48. Onishea 1, 126 F.3d at 1330.
49. See generally Leonard, supra note 19 (discussing the scope of the ADA's application in
light of the Eleventh Amendment restrictions).
50. See Yeskey v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 118 F.3d 168, 172 (discussing the split among the
circuits).
51. Hoppe, supra note 6, at 28 1-82.
52. Id. at 283-84.
53. Id.
54. 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995).
55. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1344-46.
56. Id.; see also Lange, supra note 13, at 895.
57. Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998). In fact, Yeskey has been cited
to by the Supreme Court as support for the proposition that the ADA's reach is broad. PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 677 (2001).
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motivational boot camp after receiving an initial recommendation by the
sentencing court, sued, claiming that its refusal to admit him based on his
medical history of hypertension violated the ADA.58 Based on the dis-
agreement among the circuit courts, the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections' (Pennsylvania) best chance of prevailing rested on the
federalism issue. 59 Specifically, Pennsylvania argued that because state
correctional facilities had been traditionally managed by the states, the
ADA did not cover them because they were not explicitly mentioned in the
Act.60 On this issue, the Court rejected Pennsylvania's argument by noting
that the ADA's language clearly included state prisons and prisoners
because its broad language included state entities without exception. 61
According to the Court, the petitioner's reliance on Gregory v. Ashcroft,62
where the Supreme Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act 63 did not cover state judges, 64 was misplaced. 65 The Court interpreted
Gregory only to apply where the language of a statute does not clearly
abrogate state regulation of traditionally state-managed entities, such as
when a statute contains exceptions. 66
Looking beyond the federalism issue, a discussion of Pennsylvania's
other defenses and the Supreme Court's treatment of them help define the
parameters of the discussion that follows. With respect to the argument that
state prisons do not provide prisoners with "benefits of the services,
programs, or activities" as required under the ADA, the Court recognized
that modern prisons provide inmates with a number of different services,
activities, and programs, which all bestow benefits upon them.67 A second
argument that Pennsylvania relied upon was that the words "qualified
individual with a disability" were ambiguous and were not meant to pertain
to state prisoners. 68 The Court rejected this contention by noting that the
definition of "qualified individual with a disability" unambiguously applies
to anyone with a disability.69
58. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208.
59. See Hoppe, supra note 6, at 277.
60. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208-09.
61. Id. at 209; Hoppe, supra note 6, at 277-78.
62. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
64. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
65. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209.
66. Id. at 209-10.
67. Id. at 210 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)).
68. Id.
69. Id. (applying 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
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A third argument Pennsylvania made was that the words "eligibility"
and "participation" implied voluntariness from the individual seeking to
benefit from the service or program.70 This argument was dismissed by
citing to common usage dictionaries that define the term "eligible" without
reference to voluntariness, and by analogizing to a situation in which a drug
addict is required to undergo treatment where one's eligibility is a pre-
requisite to admission.7' Even where voluntariness would be necessary to
fall within the term "eligible," a number of services, programs, and
activities were available to inmates on a voluntary basis. 72 The final
argument Pennsylvania relied on was that the ADA did not apply because
neither state prisons nor state prisoners were discussed anywhere in the
ADA's findings and purpose section.73 The Court found this argument
unpersuasive as it pointed to § 12101(a)(3)'s reference to
institutionalization, a situation akin to a prison, and emphasized the breadth
of the ADA's application to situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress. 74 The Court, for as much as it did to resolve the underlying
federalism controversy, left a number of important questions unanswered, 75
not the least of which was the scope of services, programs, or activities that
should be provided in state prisons.76 It has become recognized and
accepted for the ADA to apply to circumstances not foreseen by
Congress. 77
C. RELEVANT BACKGROUND ON THE COURT'S TURNER DECISION
Although the Supreme Court did not discuss the ADA or statutory
rights in the opinion, Turner v. Safley is often cited when a court assesses
an inmate's ADA claim. 78 In Turner, the Court was asked to determine the
constitutionality of the Missouri Division of Corrections' regulations
pertaining to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 79
The marriage regulation in question restricted inmate marriages to when
70. Id. at 211.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 211-12.
74. Id. at 212.
75. See discussion infra note 104 and accompanying text.
76. Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998).
77. Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1241 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
78. See infra Part III.
79. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987). For a discussion of Turner and its progeny, see
Burke, supra note 3, at 489-93. For a discussion of Turner and its likely impact on correctional
facilities, see generally William C. Collins, Use of Turner Test Deferring to Institutions' Security
Concerns May Sharply Limit Inmates' ADA Protection, CORR. L. REP., Feb. 1995, at 65.
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permission was granted by the prison superintendent, whose approval was
limited upon finding that "compelling reasons" were present.80 The
correspondence regulation related to communication among inmates at
different institutions and only permitted correspondence that the
classification/treatment team judged as "in the best interest of the parties
involved." 81 This regulation, however, provided an exemption both to those
inmates whose correspondence involved an immediate family member and
those whose correspondence concerned legal matters. 82 The district court,
applying the strict scrutiny standard,83 held both regulations
unconstitutional, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 84
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that it had to finish the task
that it had earlier set out to accomplish in Procunier v. Martinez85-fashion
a standard of review for courts to follow for constitutional rights cases
brought by prisoners. 86 The Court first acknowledged the Martinez
precedent, which supported the principle that inmates have valid
constitutional claims available. 87 A second principle that the Court relied
on from Martinez was that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform." 88
Martinez involved a regulation that censored the content of the inmates'
mail. 89 In striking down the content-based regulation of inmates' mail, the
Court treated the regulation as a typical First Amendment issue and applied
strict scrutiny. 90 The Turner Court differentiated the case before it from
80. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82.
81. Id. at 81-82.
82. Id. at 81.
83. The district court in Turner applied the following standard of review:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may
not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome
opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a regulation
authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental
interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Thus a restriction on
inmate correspondence that furthers an important or substantial interest of penal
administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.
Safely v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 595 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974)).
84. Turner, 482 U.S. at 83.
85. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
86. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405-06).
89. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398.
90. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
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Martinez by pointing out that the Martinez holding "turned on the fact that
the challenged regulation caused a 'consequential restriction on the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of those who [were] not prisoners.'91
The Supreme Court next cited to and discussed four cases addressing
prisoner rights decided during the time between Martinez and Turner.92 In
each of these cases, the Court noted that the standard applied to the prison
regulation was "whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights
is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penalogical objectives" rather than a
"heightened scrutiny" standard relied on by the plaintiffs, the district court,
and the court of appeals below. 93 The Eighth Circuit in Turner had
characterized these decisions as distinguishable because they either
concerned time, place, and manner restrictions or "'presumptively
dangerous' inmate activities." 94 Ultimately, the Court disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit's characterization of the four prior decisions and read them
as having a broader reach than the court of appeals was willing to provide. 95
Based on the direction that prisoner-rights jurisprudence appeared to be
headed, the Supreme Court announced the rule that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penalogical interests." 96 To aid in
the application of the rule, the Court extracted the following four factors
from prior case law for future courts to analyze when determining the
reasonableness of prison regulations: (1) the presence of a "'valid, rational
connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest" provided;97 (2) the availability of "alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to prison inmates"; 98 (3) the consequences such
an asserted constitutional right will have on prison guards, other inmates,
and on prison resources; 99 and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. 00 In
applying its announced rule and the factors to the facts before it, the Court
91. Id. (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409).
92. See id. at 85-87 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners'
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); and Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576 (1984)).
93. Id. at 87.
94. Id.
95. id. at 87-88.
96. Id. at 89.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 90.
99. Id.
100. Id. The Court was careful to point out that "[tihis is not a 'least restrictive alternative'
test." Id. Instead, an inmate claimant can demonstrate the absence of ready alternatives by
"point[ing] to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to
valid penalogical interests .... Id. at 91.
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held that the prohibition on inmate mail correspondence was valid,101 but
the regulation on marriage was not.102 As it has turned out under Turner,
inmate plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that a challenged prison
regulation is unreasonable. 103
III. APPROACHES USED BY COURTS IN DETERMINING
EXCLUSION FROM SERVICES IN PRISONS UNDER THE ADA
Of the number of issues left unresolved by the Supreme Court in
Yeskey, one of the most important relates to the appropriate level of scrutiny
applicable to prisoners' ADA claims. 104 The Supreme Court, it turns out, is
not alone. A number of lower courts have also been unable to shed much
light on this topic, despite well-intentioned efforts. Indeed, prior to its
decision in Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,O5 the Third
Circuit had noted the issue and chose to "'flag' it for another day."106 By
implication, the Supreme Court has left it to the lower courts to determine
the circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief. It is
important to note that these approaches are only considered after a plaintiff
101. Id. at 93.
102. Id. at 97.
103. See Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993).
104. See generally Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). When the Supreme
Court determined that the ADA applied to state correctional facilities, the Court limited its
discussion to resolving the general applicability question-omitting substantive discussion of the
appropriate standard of review, the relative importance of the Eleventh Amendment, and whether
the ADA's application to state prisons was pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause authority or
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that the ADA is only authorized under the Commerce Clause).
This question is important because "[f]ollowing the Supreme Court's holding in Seminole
Tribe, Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity only if it is acting pursuant to its
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d
999, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999); Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 24, at 160-72. For a discussion on the
ADA's application to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, see
generally James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May
Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REv.
91, 115-85 (2000). For a discussion on the ADA and the Eleventh Amendment, see LaCheen,
supra note 36, at 70-78.
Another issue that the Supreme Court left undecided in Yeskey was whether Congress, in
passing Title II, intended to abrogate state immunity. The Supreme Court recently held that Title I
did not abrogate state immunity consistent with the Eleventh Amendment. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). However, the circuits are split regarding Title II. Even
if the Supreme Court one day definitively holds that Congress did not intend Title H to abrogate
state immunity, the analytical approach raised in this article would not become moot because
states are increasingly delegating penal responsibility to private parties. John G. Dipiano, Note,
Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-First Century, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171, 176-77 (1995).
105. 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997).
106. Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 174-75.
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has made a prima facie ADA case.107 The approaches that the courts have
followed have failed to provide a satisfactory methodology.
A. JUDICIAL APPROACHES
Of those decisions still standing as good law, one court has rejected
application of the Turner doctrine to the ADA. 108 The lone court that did so
relied on the plain language of the ADA to require that a party seeking to
invoke the Turner doctrine show clear proof that Congress intended to
apply the ADA to state prisons.109 The validity of this decision may be in
doubt, however, because it was decided prior to Yeskey and relied on an
earlier version of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Onishea v. Hopper
(Onishea I),l1o which was subsequently vacated and modified.IlI Onishea I
would have also been added to this short list, but for the fact that the
decision was later vacated and modified with respect to its position on
whether a lower court errs when it includes Turner in its analysis of
"otherwise qualified.""12
Even with the near circuit consensus that Turner applies in some form,
the courts have adopted contrasting approaches. As a federal district court
explained, accounting for the "significant differences between managing
prisons and undertaking other endeavors" appears to be the result of a
compromise and a recognition that courts can apply the law faithfully to
prison policy."13 Ultimately, the approach adopted will determine the
degree of scrutiny under which a court will examine an inmate's ADA
claim and the degree of deference given to a prison's policy.
B. THE "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" INDIVIDUAL APPROACH
The course of consideration for the Turner doctrine in the Eleventh
Circuit has been unique, as it has spanned almost twenty years. In Onishea
v. Hopper (Onishea II1),14 a class of plaintiffs alleged that the State of
Alabama's practice of denying them access to services pursuant to an
Alabama statute segregating inmates who tested positive for the HIV virus
107. Teel v. Barnett, No. 7:01-CV-033-R, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3333, at *8-*9 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 27, 2002); McIntyre v. Robinson, 126 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408 (D. Md. 2000); Higgins v.
Beckworth, No. 5:00-CV-78, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12708, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2000);
Galvin v. Cook, No. CV-00-29-ST, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12871, at *7 (D. Or. July 14, 2000).
108. Raines v. Florida, 987 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
109. Id.
110. 126 F.3d 1323 (1 1th Cir. 1997), vacated, 133 F.3d 1377 (11 th Cir. 1998).
111. Onishea l, 126 F.3d at 1336.
112. Onishea v. Hopper (Onishea III), 171 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11 th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
113. Herndon v. Johnson, 970 F. Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
114. 171 F.3d 1289 (1lth Cir. 1999).
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amounted to a violation of Title II of the ADA."5 Because of the
segregation, the inmates were unable to participate in many of the services
offered to non-HIV-positive inmates. 116 An earlier circuit panel agreed
with most of the issues the plaintiff raised, 17 a determination that an en
banc court later vacated." 8 Onishea III arose from the en banc court's
decision to revisit the case after the parties provided new briefs."19
The district court, in evaluating the Department of Corrections' policy
of segregating inmates based on HIV status, incorporated the Turner
doctrine into the "otherwise qualified" determination.120 The district court
decided that the plaintiffs were not "otherwise qualified" based on two
independent grounds.121 First, the plaintiff's HIV-positive status posed too
significant of a health risk to surmount the "otherwise qualified"
requirement as similarly acknowledged in School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline.122 The Supreme Court in Arline held that the risk-of an HIV-
positive inmate spreading the HIV virus to other inmates and prison
personnel fell under the "otherwise qualified" part of the ADA analysis.123
Second, and more important for purposes of this article, inmates with an
ADA claim must also show that their participation would not create
disciplinary problems. 124 Thus, as part of the court's inquiry into the
plaintiffs' qualifications to participate, it considered penalogical
concerns. 
125
One of the challenges that the plaintiffs made against the district
court's finding was that it had improperly relied on Turner in determining
whether the plaintiffs were otherwise qualified.126 The Eleventh Circuit
conceded that, as a matter of its terms, Turner did not apply to statutory
115. Onishea 111, 171 F.3d at 1292-93.
116. Id. at 1292.
117. Onishea I, 126 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11 th Cir. 1997).
118. See generally Onishea II, 133 F.3d 1377.
119. Onishea 11I, 171 F.3d at 1296.
120. Id. at 1295. The ADA defines a "qualified individual" as
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and service, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
121. Onishea 1, 126 F.3d at 1328.
122. 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Onishea I, 126 F.3d at 1328.
123. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-89.
124. Onishea 111, 171 F.3d at 1295.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1299.
[VOL. 79:83
THE ADA AND PRISONS
rights. 27  Nevertheless, the court noted that one who is "otherwise
qualified" must "be able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of
his handicap."128 A program's requirements, the court wrote, are an issue
of fact. 129 Based on this legal principle, the circuit court gave the district
court some deference to determine what requirements would apply, and
determined that a district court may reasonably include penalogical
considerations as part of the analysis. 30 The court strongly suggested that
application of the Turner doctrine to the Rehabilitation Act "was not
precisely correct as a matter of legal theory, determining whether
penalogical concerns impose requirements for program participation is not
error."131 In other words, the court upheld the district court's approach
because its decision did not constitute reversible error even though the court
suggested that it might not have adopted the same analytical approach. 32
The Fourth Circuit seems to have adopted an approach similar to the
one followed by the district court in the Eleventh Circuit. In Bowman v.
Beasley,133 the plaintiffs brought a suit alleging that the South Carolina
Department of Corrections' policy of segregating HIV-positive inmates
from non-HIV-positive inmates was unlawful discrimination in violation of
the ADA. 134 Without discussing the implications of adopting the rule, the
Fourth Circuit simply wrote that "[t]he practice of segregating HIV-positive
inmates is within the wide deference afforded to prison administrators, and
it is 'reasonably related to legitimate penalogical interests."' 1 35  After
stating this rule, the court affirmed a portion of the district court's judgment
that ruled the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was "otherwise
qualified" under the ADA. 136
In addition, a federal district court in Texas explained that prison
officials must have some degree of discretion to determine whether an
127. Onishea 1, 126 F.3d at 1336. The Eleventh Circuit, in a decision later vacated en banc,
provided the following two reasons why the Turner doctrine should not have been employed: (1)
the ADA was a product of legislative and administrative bodies, separate from the judiciary which
had been one of the reasons for the Turner doctrine, and (2) the ADA's considerations of
"reasonable accommodation" and "fundamentally alter" are "somewhat duplicative" of the Turner
doctrine. Id.




131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. Nos. 00-7505, 00-7506, 2001 WL 427932 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 2001).
134. Bowman, 2001 WL 427932, at *1.
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id.
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individual qualifies for participation on security grounds.137 In Clark v.
Woods,138 the plaintiffs claimed that denying contact visitation when one of
the plaintiffs had visual and aural disabilities was illegal discrimination
based on his disability.139 The district court found the defendants had
established that one of the plaintiffs had been attending a KKK rally, while
the plaintiff on the other end of the communication had been a member of
the Aryan Nations.140 On a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
failed to rebut this evidence.141 As the district court framed it, the prison
official, based on the security risk of allowing the contact visits, determined
that the plaintiff inmate was not qualified to visit with the other inmate. 142
Courts should not incorporate the Turner principles into the term
"otherwise qualified." The primary reason is that plaintiffs seeking relief
under the ADA bear the burden of proving that they are otherwise
qualified.143 As a matter of the public policy goals that the ADA advances,
plaintiffs should not bear the burden of proving the unreasonableness of a
prison's policy. To its credit, this approach does not embrace a full
incorporation of Turner, but only attempts to include the concerns of
Turner into the ADA.
The Supreme Court in Arline held that the risk of an HIV-positive
inmate spreading the HIV virus to other inmates and prison personnel fell
under the "otherwise qualified" part of the ADA analysis.14 As consistent
with Arline and other applications of "otherwise qualified," the
qualifications of an inmate ought to be confined to aspects and
characteristics of that individual, and not involve the potential reaction of
other inmates based on their perception after the inclusion of the inmate
with the disability into a service.14 5
137. Clark v. Woods, No. 7:99-CV-173-R, 2001 WL 123668, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16,
2001).
138. No. 7:99-CV-173-R, 2001 WL 123668 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16,2001).
139. Clark, 2001 WL 123668, at *1.
140. Id. at *3.
141. Id. at *6.
142. Id. at *5.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
144. Sch. Bd. Of Nassau County v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1973) (stating that under the
"otherwise qualified" inquiry, a district court must "conduct an individualized inquiry and make
appropriate findings of fact" to determine whether integration of an individual with a contagious
disease would pose "significant health and safety risks").
145. Id.
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C. AS PART OF THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION APPROACH
An alternative approach to incorporating the Turner principles into the
ADA in the prison context involves incorporating Turner into the terms
"reasonable accommodation" and "fundamentally alter" of the ADA.146 In
Gorman v. Bartch,147 the plaintiff brought an action alleging that he was
unlawfully discriminated against because of the manner in which he was
handled and transported following his arrest. 148 The primary issue in Gor-
man was whether Gorman's allegations fit within the ADA in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Yeskey. 149 Because the Eighth Circuit express-
ly left the evidentiary aspects untouched with respect to Gorman's condi-
tion and the information and options the police had available, the court did
not provide the district court with any guidance with respect to where
security concerns should be considered in the ADA analysis, if at all.150
A year later that chance would come after one of the defendant's
claims provided the Eighth Circuit an opportunity to consider security
concerns. In Randolph v. Rodgers,151 the plaintiff, Randolph, sued after he
was not provided with an interpreter, as required by state law, for his
disciplinary hearing.152 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the defendant
argued that the district court committed reversible error when it refused to
consider security concerns of the prison in determining whether providing a
sign.language interpreter was a reasonable accommodation or whether it
imposed an undue burden. 53 The majority held that the presence of a state
law that confers a right to the plaintiff for an interpreter did not similarly
correlate to a right under federal law.' 54 Based on the court's conclusion
that the defendants had presented substantial evidence demonstrating that
fulfilling the plaintiff's request for an interpreter could have created security
issues, the court held that the district court abused its discretion and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 155
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). For a proposal advancing this
perspective and providing reasons to prefer it over the Turner standard, see Burke, supra note 3, at
504-14.
147. 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998), vacated by Gorman v. Easley, Nos. 00-1029, 00-1030,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 20325 (8th Cir. 2002).
148. Gorman, 152 F.3d at 909-10.
149. Id. at 912-13; Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-13 (1998).
150. Gorman, 152 F.3d at 913-14.
151. 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999).
152. Randolph, 170 F.3d at 853-54.
153. Id. at 857-58.
154. Id. at 859.
155. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit has also issued a decision that very much reflects
the Turner principles when characterizing the ADA's application to prisons,
but did so in a way that more closely resembles the Eighth Circuit's
approach than either of the other two approaches.156 In Crawford v.
Indiana Department of Corrections,157 the plaintiff brought an action
against the prison administration alleging that it had violated his rights
under the ADA.158 Because the case pre-dated the Supreme Court's
decision in Yeskey, the Seventh Circuit's primary concern was to determine
whether the ADA applied.159 Chief Judge Posner wrote the majority
opinion, and while he was discussing how Congress had spoken with
unquestionable clarity that the ADA applied to all public entities, he stated,
"It might seem absurd to apply the [ADA] to prisoners. Prisoners are not a
favored group in society; the propensity of some of them to sue at the drop
of a hat is well known; prison systems are strapped for funds .... "160
However, Judge Posner acknowledged that "[rfights against discrimination
are among the few rights that prisoners do not park at the prison gates."6
On remand, he instructed the district court that the meaning of the terms
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue burden" depend on the
circumstances, and in the case of prisons, "security concerns.., are highly
relevant." 162
Courts choosing to analyze ADA claims brought by prisoners within
the meaning of the statutory language of "reasonable accommodation" and
"fundamentally alter" have come closer to effectuating the goals of the
ADA than the other two approaches. Indeed, this seems like the most
logical approach. First, these terms imply that the context or setting of the
facility should matter when determining whether a person with disabilities
has been excluded from services. Second, these terms also speak to an
inquiry into the nature of the facility to determine whether the ADA should
apply. Nonetheless, as close as these courts have come, without providing
any structure to their analysis, they may not have adequately weighed the
interests at stake. The structure lacking in court decisions appears in
abstract discussions regarding the security concerns of prisons without
156. Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs., 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Roop v.
Squadrito, 70 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that "[tihe ADA does not trump
legitimate penalogical concerns").
157. 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
158. Crawford, 115 F.3d at 483.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 486.
161. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)).
162. Id. at 487.
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substantive discussions seeking to balance the values of Turner and the
ADA.
D. FULL INCORPORATION OF THE TURNER APPROACH
The case that seemed to spark this controversy is Gates v. Rowland.163
Gates was a suit brought by HIV-positive, mobility-impaired, and mentally
ill inmates who were alleging, among other claims, denial of access to
medical and mental health care. 64 Having previously held that the
Rehabilitation Act applies to state prisons, 65 the issue before the court in
Gates was how the ADA applied in the prison setting.166 The Ninth Circuit
retreated from its earlier decision when it decided to incorporate the Turner
doctrine into the inmates' ADA claim.167 Applying the Turner doctrine to
the plaintiffs' claim that being denied access to work in food service was
unlawful discrimination, the court reversed the district court, holding that
the evidence demonstrated that the perceived risk of infection had been, and
likely would remain, a source of violence. 68
In the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the segregation of HIV-positive
inmates, the court found it logical that "just as constitutional rights of
prisoners must be considered in light of the reasonable requirements of
effective prison administration, so must statutory rights applicable to the
nation's general population be considered in light of effective prison
administration." 69 That, along with the fact that the ADA applied general-
ly, not having been passed specifically to deal with prisons, enabled the
court to rely on the standard of review set out in Turner.170 Moreover, the
court was persuaded by its recognition of the difficult task assigned to
prison officials, as well as the appropriateness that decisions affecting
prisons be made by the legislative and executive branches. 171 Thus, finding
that many, if not all, of the reasons for affording greater deference to prison
regulation of inmates applied when evaluating constitutional and statutory
163. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
164. Gates, 39 F.3d at 1442-43. Judge Tallman's observation in the dissenting opinion in a
recent case exemplifies the Gates' perspective: "Turner established that a prison regulation is
valid even where it impinges on prisoners' constitutional rights ...." Hargis v. Foster, 282 F.3d
1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added). In dicta, the Fourth
Circuit has cited Gates and Turner with approval. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1346, 1355
(4th Cir. 1995).
165. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988).
166. Gates, 39 F.3d at 1444.
167. Id. at 1447.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1446.
170. Id. at 1446-47.
171. Id. at 1448.
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rights, the Ninth Circuit incorporated the Turner doctrine into the prisoners'
ADA claim. 172
Adoption of the Turner doctrine to the ADA typically means that
prison officials no longer have to show that proposed modifications would
create an undue burden.173 The initial burden of proof switches to the
prisoner to overcome the presumed "common sense" prison policy.174
However, this re-allocation of the burden of proof does not automatically
fall onto the prisoner. For example, the Third Circuit declined to decide
definitively on whether to superimpose the Turner doctrine into the ADA
because the defendants had resorted to asserting security concerns without
reasoned support.175 Unless a defendant makes an initial showing that
security may be in fact implicated, the Third Circuit held that such a
defense would not be considered.I7 6 Also, the Ninth Circuit has held that a
prison facility wishing to invoke the Turner doctrine must, at a bare
minimum, provide a reasoned explanation.177 The test the Ninth Circuit
articulated was that there be some penalogical reason "urged in the district
court" that is "sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful ... review."1 78
Once a defendant satisfies this minimum threshold, the plaintiff must refute
the reason. 179
This approach is the least desirable of the three because it acts as a
standard of review by which a court first determines whether the prison
policy is reasonable on security grounds.S0 Full incorporation of Turner
places plaintiffs on the defensive by requiring them to argue against the
presumption that the prison regulation is reasonable. 181 Courts relying on
Turner in this fashion, not surprisingly, quote language from prior decisions
that support providing great deference to prison officials.182 This judicial
posture places inmates with disabilities in a position before the courts where
they become merely inmates and their respective disabilities become irrele-
172. Id.
173. See Armstrong v. Davis, No. 99-15152, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6821, at *7 (9th Cir.
Apr. 11, 2000).
174. Id.
175. Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2001) (regarding the necessity
of furnishing a particular auxiliary aid or service).
176. Id. at 327.
177. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. Id. (quoting Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990)).
179. Id.
180. See Burke, supra note 3, at 499-503 (discussing application of the Turner doctrine by
circuit courts).
181. Id. at 499.
182. Id. at 500.
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vant for purposes of the courts' initial review.183 Thus, those courts
adopting a full incorporation of the Turner doctrine manifest an attitudinal
shift contrary to the purpose of the ADA.184
In addition, plaintiffs not only bear the burden of showing that prison
policies are unreasonable, but courts will also place plaintiffs' ADA claims
on hold until they resolve the initial issue.185 Furthermore, the way in
which prison policies receive initial consideration by courts, it inevitably
would seem to influence courts' perceptions of the validity of inmates'
ADA claims.186 It is conceivable that in cases in which plaintiffs escape the
first hurdle and courts consider their ADA claims, potential security risks
may still color courts' judgments. 187 Even without this risk, discrimination
by prisons against inmates with disabilities is entitled to privilege from the
enormous level of deference courts will ascribe to prison policies-so long
as they are reasonably related to security issues, courts will not hear
inmates' ADA claims. 188
In sum, one method of incorporating the Turner principles involves
considering penalogical interests, such as security concerns, within the
meaning of the term "otherwise qualified." This approach places the
burden of proof unfairly on the plaintiff to show a modification would not
be inconsistent with the prison's interests. A second method involves
considering the Turner principles within the term "reasonable
accommodation." While a more logical fit, this approach lacks the
analytical structure necessary to consider prisoners' interests. The final
approach, full incorporation of Turner, is undesirable because it
marginalizes inmates' disabilities and overwhelmingly tips the balance of
policymaking on the side of the prisons.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN
INMATE'S ADA CLAIM SHOULD PREVAIL
A. CRITICAL FACTORS COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER IN REVIEWING
STATE PRISON SERVICE OR PROGRAM AVAILABILITY
As Part III illustrated, the lack of guidance with respect to how courts
proceed through each approach risks reaching inconsistent judgments-not
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 503.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 503-04.
188. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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to mention less predictable outcomes. The division among circuits is not
the problem or the ill that this article seeks to alleviate. The inevitable
convergence of Yeskey and Turner suggests that what truly is at stake is the
very existence of the ADA in prisons. Instead of choosing which circuit
approach would achieve the most favorable result, this article, more
importantly, contributes to this discussion by providing factors that courts
should consider when determining the validity of an inmate's ADA claim.
To determine whether an inmate has been excluded from a prison's
service, courts should examine such a claim within the elasticity of the
statutory language of "reasonable accommodation" and "fundamentally
alter."' 89  This approach begins where the status quo reasonable
modification approach leaves off.190 Courts should undergo an analysis of
the parties' claims in light of a number of explicit factors, none of which
courts have made any attempt to consider except on an ad hoc basis. Many
of these factors, at least to my knowledge, have been discussed in prior
cases, while others have not. These factors derive both from prior case law
and from merging the principles underlying the ADA and Turner.
In order to engage in an analysis that balances the principles of the
ADA and Turner, courts should begin by separating the analysis into two
levels. Under what can be labeled the primary line analysis, the court's
primary attention should be directed first to determining the purpose of the
service and the needs of the individual inmate. Looking to the purpose or
nature of the service, a court would look to the goal the service seeks to
advance (penalogical or otherwise), the existence of other, non-ADA
related reasons for exclusion, the service's relative prevalence in other state
correctional facilities, and the need that the service satisfies for the inmate
and the institution. Then, as far as the needs of the inmate are concerned,
courts should assess the nature of the private interest at stake, giving proper
attention to the importance of the sought-after service to that individual
situated in a state prison. Much of the preceding consideration will aid in
this part of the analysis.
Also important is the element of duration, both in terms of the amount
of time in which the inmate alleges to have been discriminated against and
the amount of time it took for the prison officials to provide a response. 191
In Beckford v. Portuondo,192 the plaintiff challenged the correctional
189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
190. For a discussion of the "reasonable modification" approach, see Burke, supra note 3, at
504-13.
191. See Beckford v. Portuondo, 151 F. Supp. 2d 204, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (evaluating a
plaintiff's ADA claim that he had been placed in a non-wheelchair accessible cell).
192. 151 F. Supp. 2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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facility's decision to deny him access to a wheelchair accessible cell. 193
The defendants had placed the plaintiff temporarily in a plastic-shielded
cell, which was not wheelchair accessible at the time, in response to the
plaintiff's earlier attempts to litter guards with feces and urine. 194 Once the
plaintiff's misbehavior stopped, the defendants returned him to his
wheelchair accessible cell. 195  The same district court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim that he was denied access to outdoor recreation facilities
because he had only been denied access while the ramp was in disrepair,
and once notified, the prison officials promptly repaired it.196
Still within the primary line analysis, courts ought to inquire into the
penalogical interests, which should only operate as a defense when prisons
proffer sufficient evidence that including the inmates in the services would
pose a dangerous, direct threat to other prisoners or prison officials.197
Courts, in assessing the validity of a security concern claim, should reject
reliance on generalizations and stereotypes, and instead demand objective
evidence.198 The temporal sequence of this inquiry is intentional because a
court would first look to the individual and the service. This would
minimize the risk of overlooking individuals' ADA claims and would
enable courts to undergo a more thorough analysis of security because they
would have greater awareness of context. Common sense can often
determine the validity of many claims of heightened security risk.
In dicta from Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections, Judge
Posner suggested that the reasonable accommodation defense be given
greater consideration in the prison context, whether it be that no reasonable
accommodation can be made or that reasonable accommodation will
impose an undue burden.199 Placing too much importance on the security
concerns of prisons shifts the focus away from the ADA's purpose-to
eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities, which requires an
examination of the individual, not scrutiny of the effects on the prison.
After conducting the primary line analysis, courts should conduct a
secondary line analysis. Considerations falling under this category should
accordingly receive less weight than those considerations in the primary
line analysis. These factors deserve less weight because, in most cases, the




197. See Burke, supra note 3, at 505 (discussing the unique security concerns of prisons in
relation to a reasonable modification analysis of ADA claims by prisoners).
198. Rubin & McCampbell, supra note 7.
199. Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs., 115 F.3d 481,486 (7th Cir. 1997).
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inference that they raise is less probative. In many cases, the outcome
might become so one-sided that a court may forego this part of the analysis
entirely. Realistically, the factors within the secondary line analysis would
most likely significantly affect the outcome of a case only where a court is
having a difficult time arriving at a decision after undergoing the primary
line analysis.
One secondary factor would be determining attempts made by facility
officials to accommodate individuals with disabilities and in other areas of
accommodation, whether performed in response to a request or demand or
done voluntarily. 00 A second factor would look to the track record of
institutions' past compliance with the ADA.201 These two legally relevant
issues attempt to discern the presence of good or bad faith, which can help a
court determine whether inmates have been excluded from services on
account of their disabilities. These factors deserve less deference because
they do not account for changes in prison administration policy and usually
entail actions taken by the prison that are less proximately related to the
immediate issue at hand.
B. A JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS FRAMEWORK
The above approach, if adopted by a court, would encourage reasoned
judicial decision-making that accounts for both competing concerns. With-
out such a framework, there is a danger that courts may decide cases
without regard to the principles of the ADA or Turner. What may at first
glance appear to be a one-sided approach in favor of inmates with
disabilities is indeed not the case. An expressed emphasis on the service
itself and the needs of individual inmates is necessary in order for the ADA
goals to be effectuated in the prison setting. In addition, without explicit
discussion and recognition of the services and the needs of the individual in
question, case outcomes run the risk of resulting from an overemphasis of
the penalogical concerns.
Apart from litigation, an approach that sets forth the various considera-
tions that a court will make would provide an opportunity for correctional
institutions to engage in policy planning to ensure future compliance with
the ADA. This proposed analytical framework retains the protections
afforded to persons with disabilities provided by the ADA, yet also is
cognizant of the unique issues that arise in the prison setting. For example,
200. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1356 (4th Cir. 1995) (evaluating the fact that the
prison "took significant steps to address" the inmate's complaints).
201. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 861 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that past conduct
indicates a "significant possibility" that injurious acts will be repeated in the future).
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allowing the unique security concerns of a state prison to trump the protec-
tion against discrimination afforded to inmates with disabilities without
closely considering how the service exclusion harms inmates would
promote further physical, emotional, and psychological injury to inmates.
The reach of the ADA to prisons is not limited to "logistical matters of
prison administration," but has also been extended to include substantive
decision-making by prison officials and boards.202
This approach, as in the case of the ADA generally, is not meant to
entitle any one individual or group with a privilege or subsidy. Rather, its
purpose, pursuant to the ADA, is to eliminate a burden.203 Emphasis on the
individual and the service in question within the factored analysis is neces-
sary in light of a couple of important considerations. Extreme caution in
the area of the ADA's application to prisons generally is warranted given
the fact that prisoners do not have a general right to choose the correctional
facility where they will be placed. Thus, many of the "self-help" measures
used to mitigate or avoid further injury are not available in a prison
setting.204
Not to be overlooked, an affirmation by the courts that the ADA
applies with some force to a group of individuals often the target of public
scorn 205 reinforces the importance of the ADA and, as a corollary, the evils
of discrimination against persons with disabilities. Moreover, as a Kansas
district court wrote, "the ADA reflects, to some degree, contemporary
standards of decency concerning treatment of individuals with
disabilities."206 The decency with which inmates are regarded in the area of
discrimination in services is especially important because inmates who face
architectural barriers or who are victims of discriminatory treatment in the
provision of services, often do not have adequate means to mitigate or
prevent such discrimination that tends to be more prevalent outside of
prisons.207 Despite additional difficulties that inmates with disabilities
encounter in prisons, society has no choice but to incarcerate them. Also,
because many prisoners with disabilities are released from prison we should
facilitate their adjustment both into and out of prison by diminishing
psychological, as well as physical barriers. 208  Another important
202. See, e.g., Thompson v. Davis, 282 F.3d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 2002). As one court stated,
"Rights against discrimination are among the few rights that prisoners do not park at the prison
gates." Crawford, 115 F.3d at 486.
203. Thompson, 282 F.3d at 785.
204. Walker v. Washington, No. 96 C 0469, 1998 WL 30701, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1998).
205. Robbins, supra note 13, at 52-53, 66.
206. Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1031 (D. Kan. 1999).
207. Hoppe, supra note 6, at 276.
208. Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs., 115 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1997).
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consideration for adopting this approach is that, as the ADA requires
exclusion, a prison is likely to have provided these services because they
were either viewed as necessary or important.2 09 In this light, courts will be
aided by this inference.
A concern voiced by some scholars relates to the potential of sub-
jecting prisons to greater financial burdens. 2 10 This concern is overstated in
the context of the aforementioned proposal. First, nothing in the proposed
approach seeks to limitlessly expand the ADA's application. More general-
ly, an increase in litigation would be significantly diminished considering
that plaintiffs, at a minimum, would still have the prima facie burden of
establishing that they (1) are qualified individuals, (2) with disabilities, and
(3) seek to prohibit discrimination by a public entity. 21'
In addition, aside from the full incorporation approach, relying on
factors merely clarifying those considerations a court should make would
not have a significant effect on the number of ADA cases brought by
inmates.2 12 Even without subjecting prisons to financial ruin, one may
argue that by requiring compliance, state correctional entities' resources
could be siphoned away from much needed education, recreation, and
rehabilitation. 2t 3 However, once an entity decides to provide a general
service, the ADA requires that the methods used "do not have the purpose
or effect of impairing its objectives with respect to individuals with
disabilities." 2 14
Second, regarding financial burdens that would be imposed,2 15 such
burdens would be balanced against those modifications that are
reasonable.2 16 The cost burden argument also provides a compelling need
for the ADA in prisons. If prisons are indeed strapped for funding and by
accommodating those individuals with disabilities would incur additional
costs, then they are unlikely to take on the initiative to include inmates with
disabilities in their available services because the incentive structure is for
prisons to remain inactive or at least passive.2 17 The fact that prisoners do
209. Hoppe, supra note 6, at 276.
210. See, e.g., Sandra J. Carnahan, The American with Disabilities Act in State Correctional
Institutions, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 316 (1999); D. Kyle Sampson, Can State Prisoners Sue
Under Federal Disabilities Law?, 11 Sep. UTAH B.J. 17, 18 (1998).
211. Hoppe, supra note 6, at 283.
212. Burke, supra note 3, at 509-10.
213. Sampson, supra note 210, at 18.
214. Niece v. Pitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1217-18 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (quoting Concerned
Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986, 991 (S.D. Fla.
1994)).
215. Lange, supra note 13, at 897.
216. Burke, supra note 3, at 510-11.
217. Robbins, supra note 13, at 54 & n.25.
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not enjoy equal opportunity and independence in the same way as those not
incarcerated, and are not economically self-sufficient, 218 further demon-
strates the need for an approach that fully considers their ADA rights and
balances them against the security concerns of accommodation.
V. CONCLUSION
In order for courts to resolve controversies arising under the ADA in
actions brought by prisoners with disabilities consistent with Congress's
intent, courts must rely on factors that properly consider the services and
the needs of individuals seeking inclusion in light of the unique setting of
prisons. Under the approach discussed in this article, inmates with
disabilities would be more likely to realize the full extent of the protection
against discrimination guaranteed by the ADA because the multi-tiered
approach would require courts to consider inmates' individual needs. At
the same time, prisons would have ample opportunity to voice their
concerns regarding an accommodation's impact on security.
Such an analytical framework would also promote greater consistency
by informing state correctional facilities in day-to-day operational decisions
and providing prisoners with disabilities, and their attorneys, with a more
reliable forecasting device when deciding whether a claim should be
brought. The proposed standards properly incorporate the special
circumstances inmates confront in correctional facilities and, consistent
with the intent of Congress, would provide inmates with a better
opportunity to remedy discrimination in state prisons. At the same time,
penalogical concerns raised by prison officials would be properly
considered by courts to help ensure that such accommodations would not
unreasonably create security risks. Requiring plaintiffs to overcome the
obstacle of demonstrating unreasonableness pursuant to Turner does not
afford courts an opportunity to properly evaluate ADA claims against
prisons and, in a majority of cases, denies inmates the protections of the
ADA.
218. Lange, supra note 13, at 887.
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